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JOURNEY TO ISIDORE





The literature on the topic of utopia is rich and extensive as are the 
number of utopias composed, yet Auguste Comte’s contribution is curiously 
absent from the contemporary debate1. It is curious for a number of 
reasons, not least because his was a major contribution both to the utopian 
method and within the sociological tradition his utopia was the first and 
most carefully crafted. The exclusion of his work is total: not a mention in 
Ruth Levitas (2013), or in Frederic Jameson (2005), and hardly a mention in 
Krishnan Kumar (1991—these three authors form the basis of the discussion 
that follows). This was not the case when H. G. Wells wrote his A Modern Utopia 
(2005 [1905]) and advocated the method of utopia as the key to any success-
ful sociology, a judgement recently supported and advocated by Levitas. 
What is it in Comte that suggests that either his work is no longer needed and 
thus forgotten, or that it contains something so horrific that it is best avoided? 
Even if it contained profound errors of a misguided even dangerous project, this 
in itself might be something to learn from2: it is currently in the oubliette and we 
can even now put a name to this place. Perhaps Gray in his devastating attack on 
attempts to realise utopias in the modern world has found a way of recovering 
Comte, but only to launch another clinical condemnation on both Comte and 





Cary  in his comments on these brief extracts  from Saint-Simon mentions subsequent  in-





1. WHAT IS UTOPIA?
Jameson suggests that utopian thought positions itself in an “enclave”—it 
has a base, a place, a Garden of Eden, in which an imaginative experiment 
occurs that corresponds to a desire for a better world. It is not a political blue-
print, a programme of action, but it can inspire them and indeed become one. 
There is a division in types of utopia: on the one hand those that are positioned 
in the immediate, in the irruptive here and now and those that are planned 
(see Baudrillard’s critique of Marxism [1975 (1973) et 2007] on this distinction 
and his arguments clearly apply to Comte, deferring utopia is the key source of 
hierocratic power). It is, as an exercise in what Levitas calls “the imaginative 
reconstruction of society” that conjures up a different world. 
Here I suggest that utopia is either a eutopia, a world considered a better 
world, or a dystopia, a worse one. But there is also an atopia (as suggested by 
Roland Barthes to indicate an ungraspable world that is constantly surprising 
and unpredictable, as if it had no structure.) Max Weber famously described 
his “ideal type” as a kind of utopia—a formation that did not exist in any 
concrete historical case but was a kind of idealisation that could be used as an 
abstraction for comparison with real concrete instances; such an abstraction 
has in this sense a utopian dimension. But Weber limits his discussion to a 
range of such types, such as a bureaucracy, and it is simply a list of elements. 
In fact this use is rather like the idea in Comte of fictions used in mathema-
tics and science that disappear into the analysis. Yet Weber also suggested 
the use of fiction in the hypothetical experiment where history could have 
gone a different way3. A utopia on the other hand is the depiction of a society 
with specific features, people, institutions, and a way of life that stands on its 
own. Levitas argues that it is precisely because it is holistic that it is valuable. 
A reader would recognise the way the author has framed these features as 





least two inspired by Comte, one called Altruria4 and one called Herland5. An 
interesting outline of a possible Comtean utopian novel was suggested to 
George Eliot (1990, p.241-248) by Frederic Harrison in 1866, but this chal-
lenge was not taken up. These are written either as a eutopia or dystopia 
(a warning or critique), but then these aspects can change, be reversed: star-
ted as a eutopia, Brave New World became a dystopia. Elementary techniques 
are ones of exaggeration, additions, substractions, inversions, displacements, 
new arrangements and so on. Simple predictions, such as that attempted by 
Daniel Bell (1987) are evidently not utopian in this sense. 
In Comte there are clear utopian flights of technological imagination, close 
to science fiction proper—the most extreme being the correction of aberrations 
in the earth’s orbit, the ultimate positive regulation! (Mill, 1961 [1865], p.192; 
Wernick, 2001, p.174-176)6. A utopian technique is to present biology, for 
example, as a treatise written in the future (Comte, 2001 [1851-1854], vol.1, p.517). 
The utopia appealed to some, but was rejected as dystopic by others; it was a 
utopia that inspired small groups of enthusiasts of the religion of Humanity, 
some of whom are said to exist to this day in Brazil like a species on the verge 
of extinction (in 2009 the roof of the Church of Humanity in Rio collapsed after 
termites had been at work). This was a secular religion, meticulously construc-
ted around a new thirteen month calendar. For Comte Year One is 1789, not 
the French revolution’s own calendar which began in 1793 and was abandoned 
a decade later, and not the calendar invented by the Saint-Simonians after the 
death of Saint-Simon himself in 1825, with days of the week named after leaders 
of the group (Bazard, Rodrigues, and so on). Comte toyed with the idea of repla-
cing the days of the week, with Maridi (after marriage) as Monday, and Humanidi 








2. COMTE’S SUBJECTIVE METHOD
As with his work in the objective mode, his thinking in the subjective one 
is highly inventive. It is in the formulation of the problems of the religion of 
Humanity that he introduces a number of decisive new terms. Humanity as a 
concept is not identical with humanity as a species, mankind. It is the product 
of distinct elaboration by idealisation of the most valued contributions and 
contributors to human civilization conceived as a vast accumulation of the 
products of previous generations. But this term was not an isolated innovation; 
there are three other important concepts. 
The first, altruism, which is perhaps the major Comtean contribution to the 
debate on ethics and morals in the second half of the xixth century, and like the 
word sociology immediately taken up throughout European cultures and beyond. 
Comte’s fundamental critique of liberal individualism is that “the being […] 
who loves nothing outside himself, and really lives for himself alone, is by that 
very fact condemned to pass his life in a miserable alternation of ignoble torpor 
and uncontrollable excitement” (2001 [1851-1854], vol.1, p.566). The second is 
very less well known and figured only for a time in sociological discourse: the 
concept of sociocracy. The third, biocracy and the “biocratic league” was rarely 
referred to subsequently. In his account of the transition to the final, positive 
polity, he wants very clearly to show that there is the appearance of quite 
new phenomena in previous transitions such as the emergence of the “social” 
within the Roman transition, and he wants to show the beginnings and evolu-
tion of the final sociocratic formation, and its vicissitudes. His thesis is that 
there has been a major breakdown in the continuity between the mediaeval 
transition and the oncoming organic crisis of the West: a reconstructed socio-
cracy, as the internal structure of status transmission, is necessary to resolve 
the crisis. This theoretical elaboration must be controlled by the theory of 
human nature: it is not a projection from present trends, but rather a continua-
tion from the lost tradition of Catholic Europe. 
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Of course, when he discusses the immediate issues of how to attain this 
goal he begins to construct a programme which takes into account current 
political and other issues, and this account is clearly “dynamic” and a mix 
of objective and subjective modes. But the discussion of the utopia itself, 
even if some parts look as though they are a political programme, pertain to 
the space-time of a social formation I call here Isidore. Indeed Comte begins 
to live in his utopia when he writes, he says, “posthumously”. Given this 
characterisation of Comte’s project, it is clear that the crucial concept is that 
of sociocracy, the social structure of the positive polity8. 
Very simply however, if sociocracy is the rule by social scientists, or by a 
stratum of governors counselled by social scientists, who appoint their own 
successors (not by birth or election), the field of variation of the concept is 
a large one. Comte’s own specific version, modelled on the Catholic-Feudal 
separation of spiritual and temporal authorities, is only one possible version. 
The Catholic Middle Ages was, he admitted, a unique form of monotheism, a 
form not found in Orthodox Christianity or Islam. It was, he claimed, a result 
of a conjunctural situation9. The sociocracy it introduced secured in a new 
way the triumph of “continuity” and social reproduction, over the simple 
“solidarity” of elements of the social system. But this new system disintegra-
ted leaving a society in permanent crisis. This crisis exploded finally in the 
Revolution in France when the underlying antagonisms became acute.
8  This term has dropped out of modern sociology but it was extensively used by sociologists 
at  the end of  the xixth  century, particularly by Lester Ward  (1893, p.315-331). He used 
“sociocracy” in order to distinguish between socialism, communism, and liberalism, and his 
own position—a substantially modified Comteanism.







Thus a new era began in 1789, and yet with the Calendar of the Revolution a 
grave conflict of times was installed for some years in Europe, until Napoleon I 
abandoned the new Calendar in 1805. But what Comte wanted and what figured 
in the utopia was the cycle of games and festivals which would mark the days, 
months, and years of the new order. These games and festivals would replace, 
for a time, the theatre itself. They would re-enact the evolution of “Humanity” 
in an endless cycle of remembrance, an almost continuous festival, in order to 
define clearly its “subjective” transcendence over any “objective” individual or 
group. Each element, strata of society would have its day in relation to its trans-
cendent subjective double10. This would be organised by the new priesthood, 
and Comte goes to considerable length to specify in which month, and on 
which day of the week each ritual would take place. The priesthood would also 
be in charge of education and health. Education would be organised globally 
so that the same curriculum would be followed everywhere and taught on the 
same day throughout the world—this would allow scholars to travel anywhere 
and be sure that they would not miss any element of the course. 
The decisive contribution of the mediaeval period was the separation of 
the spiritual power of the Church and the temporal powers, thus it too is 
incorporated subjectively. Comte maintains the Augustinian division with a 
major shift in mind: all the temporal powers should be reduced to the size of 
city states. They are not independent of the spiritual power, and controlled as 
“Intendancies”—that is their principal governors are appointed and accoun-
table to the Priesthood, the High Priest personally. 
One of the central aims of the project was to establish the authority of the 
new priesthood. He wrote on dignity, on purity, on sanctity, on relative poverty. 
Low status was correlated with impurity, sexual, physical, material. He noted 
the importance of wealth rejection in the great priesthoods, and its spoliation 
by wealth. Work in any way connected with the worship of Humanity would 
always be gratuitous; those that worked for Humanity would be supported 
10  Games of chance would no doubt be prohibited, games of mimicry encouraged.
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from donations and gifts in order to remain pure. One of the surprising but 
rarely noticed propositions was that there would be a systematic form of sacred 
gift exchange on the practices found among the polytheists of Oceania which 
“show us the real power which this institution may exert” (2001 [1851-1854], 
vol.2, p.133). He noted the importance of avoidance of sexual activity for high 
moral status and of a disciplined regime of prayer for moral advance. Avoidance 
of alcohol, tobacco, and sexual activity would improve health. He noted the 
importance of the rejection of force, and banned the direct involvement in 
political power by the priesthood: it would not govern directly (yet somehow 
it would “reorganise industry” (ibid., p.320). Force was necessary in any state, 
he said, but force alone would never be effective without moral supremacy. 
These are the lessons drawn from his analyses in all his previous volumi-
nous writings, lessons drawn from a comparative analysis of many cultures at 
many different stages of development. He says he had become the “interprete” 
of Humanity, but in fact he had conceived and defined the nature of a new 
God—and in this sense was bound to provide, despite his own declarations, 
its ontological metaphysics.
In the Preface to his last completed work, Synthèse subjective, Comte says he is 
writing the work posthumously, imagining himself writing in 1927—he would 
have been 129 years old. He is “writing in the year 1927, in my eyes the seventy-
third year of the normal state” and one can calculate that the first year was 1855. In 
the System, he had announced that the provisional beginning of the final stage was 
1789, and the definitive stage would be 1855. He says that imagining himself such 
clears many of the problems (the metaphysical stage) out of the way which he says 
“I have been bound always to represent as extinct.” He then quotes a passage from 
his 1855 Testament which says, “occupying my tomb in anticipation, I can hence-
forth hold to the living a posthumous language, which will the more completely 
freed from the various prejudices, especially, the scientific prejudices, to which 




I suggest that this tomb is situated in a place called Isidore, the location of 
Comte’s utopia, rather than the less vivid “Republic of the West”. It is then 
rather straightforward to give a picture of this place from Comte’s discussion. 
It is Eurasian, but without large states, there is “France”, “Italy”, “Germany”, 
but no Italian, German, French states, only City states exist within these 
frames. The language is Italian throughout. A biocratic league (Humanity 
takes responsibility for and governs a specific domain of nature) is established 
with its three fold division of animals, some of which are in the process of 
status improvement—herbivores en route to becoming carnivores—as the 
biocracy within Humanity is the preserve of carnivores only (Comte, 2001 
[1851-1854], vol.1,  p.510; Lévi-Strauss, 2001; Braunstein, 2009,  p.174-17612). 
Women now to remain virginal conceive by artificial means or give birth by 
parthenogenesis, and the sexual drive is sublimated. Population growth has 
been dramatically reduced. The spiritual powers, priesthood and its functio-
ning (gathering information) are in full evidence. Education and medicine 
and a large swathe of legal process are now the preserve of the priesthood. 
There are no universities, and a massive destruction of books is in living 
memory: all scientific knowledge is condensed into 10 volumes; each priest 
may possess 100 volumes of the positive library chosen by the Pontiff. A 
feature of the life of the priesthood is that the High Priest selects a problem 
to be solved and sets the whole sacerdotal order to work on it13. Education 
requires acquisition at an early age of four or five languages, including Italian, 











One of the aims of education is to eliminate excessive “personality” in the 
individual. No hospitals are necessary as illnesses have been dramatically elimi-
nated by the social harmonic balance Positivism has produced. Such illnesses that 
do appear are treated domestically or by priests (who have evolved a radical new 
one-cause theory of pathology). Life expectancy has been significantly extended. 
There is no objective “science” as previously known, this practice has passed 
into poetry, the Gai savoir regenerated. There is no journalism: in its place there 
are signed posters everywhere. But reading and writing have also largely moved 
from the material external world, paper, into space itself which is the medium 
of pure emotion. Cultural life is an eternal cycle of festivals of commemoration. 
The theatre repressed during the transition (“it is for Positivism finally to 
suppress the theatre, as an institution at once irrational and immoral”, ibid., p.384) 
has returned; Comte’s own highly sensitive appreciation of the revived theatre and 
opera is clearly in evidence when he prophesised “the repertory of each of the five 
Western nations supplies a sufficient number of masterpieces, dramatic or musi-
cal, to allow of one performance a week throughout the year, without ever condes-
cending to secondary works and without a too frequent recurrence of the great 
works”—these largely take place in the sacred sphere. And to add some excitement 
now that the final state has been achieved a controlled revival will take place “in 
the capital of each intendancy, the Western theatre will bring together five times 
a week all classes, to enjoy gratuitously the great dramatic productions, not more 
than two representations of each to be given in the course of the year.” (ibid.). 
The crucial bedrock of the social conscience is in fact located in the proleta-
riat, the “homogeneous” decisive estate in the system. Working class clubs, and 
salons, are the basis; he calls them “laboratories” of strong movements of public 
opinion. The “sociocracy” at the top, the highly educated “heterogeneous” 
higher stratum of society takes on a strange new form. It is composed of patrician 
families across the temporal and spiritual spheres. The priesthood is “enthu-
siastically” supported by women, now the dominant spiritual sex in the family. 
The family itself has evolved to composite forms so as to include by adoption 
auxiliaries of various types (domestics, specialists). The priesthood has become 
a kind of intermediate sex between the masculine temporal power and women, 
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and clothing would reflect this status (ibid., p.225). The proletariat also supports 
the priesthood as it oversees the profane sphere of finance and industry14.
This is a total sociocratic system of the four essential organs (priests, 
industrialists, proletarians and women). The bourgeoisie comprising lawyers, 
journalists, speculators and rentiers, a non-productive class, has become extinct; 
the nation state, and the political class, as known in the metaphysical state, has 
simply withered away following the period of the dictatorship of the proletariat. 
Wars have ceased, industry and technology flourish in vast public projects with 
manufacturing and engineering now under the direct control of the bankers 
overseen by the priests. Each of the major institutions are strictly meritocratic, 
not by direct examination or election as the priesthood now allocates agents 
to functions—always seen as one of its most difficult tasks. The surprising 
degree of stability of life is such that there are few new scientific discoveries or 
technological inventions. Modernity, the “modern crisis” has come to an end. 
Even the Amish have now converted to the post-modern religion of Humanity.
A vast commemoration festival in memory of Isidore-Auguste-Marie-François-
Xavier Comte is now a central feature of the round of festivals, occurring on 
5 September each year. There is, then, a complete revival of the separation of 
Church and State as would have been found in the Middle Ages, and which for 
example Henry VIII, in England ended with spectacular violence. The leading 
industrialists are all members of the Church of the new religion of Humanity, 
require its rituals in legitimising their powerful positions, their marriages, their 
funerals, and their eventual incorporation into Humanity as realised in the cycle 
of Commemorations of great names. Of course there still exists the profane world, 
those outside the Church with obligations to its legal order and authorities, and 
these live in peaceful harmony with the Church community. And there have been 
some excommunications, where individuals have been thrown into the profane 
world; and there have been a number of capital executions sanctioned by the High 
Priest. There are obviously a large number of non-practising believers. 
14  Industry is the general term for banking, manufacturing and agriculture.
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Interestingly, there has been a rather noticeable shift in the object of worship 
from direct sociolatry, worship of the Supreme Being itself, to the worship of 
the Great Fetish, the Earth, now regarded more and more as having been reborn 
as a living being. Émile Littré recalled that, at the last meeting of the Positive 
Society he attended, Comte reported that he had sent a “brief” (bref—a Papal 
instruction) to a member. “From that moment on Comte made himself the High 
Priest of the Church of Humanity, a Pope, and wrote briefs” (Littré, 1863, p.631). 
Without knowing it, Littré had attended a meeting in Isidore. It was from such 
small beginnings that Isidore came into being, and Comte imagined that it would 
be fully inaugurated in 1889 (2001 [1851-1854], vol.4, p.437).
4. THE UTOPIA AND THE REAL WORLD
A more complex idea of the law of the three states can come into existence 
as a result of this reading. As I have suggested, the key use of the utopia, Isidore, 
in Comte’s own project, was to enable sociologists to understand the nature 
of the metaphysical transition. Because the utopian description is detailed it 
has been possible of course to check the actual historical sequel with Comte’s 
predictions—and indeed Littré did that in great detail. And that was a prime, if 
little known contribution to sociology. What is of interest here however is not 
that comparison itself, but rather what has happened to the central concept of 
the metaphysical stage in Comte’s sociology. This is important since the whole 
construction of the utopia was intended as a point of reference from which clari-
fication of the lived metaphysical state could be understood. As such the central 
achievement of Comte’s objective sociology remain the lectures on this forma-
tion in the Cours de philosophie positive written from January 1841 to January 1842, 
(Lessons 55, 56, and 57, in Comte, 1975 [1830-1842], vol.2, p.380-697). These are 
located firmly in the real world, even if the chain of presentation of the various 
series are constructed from a notional future state, which many understood to 
be some kind of association of savants, metaphorically indicated by Comte as a 
kind of college or “church” or “clerisy” (Knights, 1978). 
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It is clear that some seismic shift has happened as a result of analysis going 
into the subjective mode. In fact, for all practical purposes, the metaphysical 
polity was still effectively dominant in the objective mode. There opened up a 
gap between the sociologists like Littré and John S. Mill in the objective mode, 
and those in the subjective mode. Relations between the two groups became 
bitter as the former read the utopia as a dystopia: Mill wrote that Comte aimed 
“at establishing (though by moral more than by legal appliances) a despotism 
of society over the individual surpassing anything contemplated in the poli-
tical ideal of the most rigid disciplinarian among the ancient philosophers” 
(1987 [1859], p.75)15. Certainly in the spiritual corporation Comte wanted the 
Pontiff to have absolute power. But what had Comte actually achieved in his 
new analysis of the period 1789-1854, after all these particular phenomena 
were not dreamt up? In this exposition Comte presents in fact a new conti-
nuity, 1789-1854, and then continues directly into three subsequent fictional 
transition phases to the final state. Is this continuity to be understood from 
the basic theory previously outlined (that the determinant movement is the 
progression of science and industry) or are they now related in a different way? 
Comte’s new sociological analysis tries to pass between outright retrogres-
sion and continued revolutionary or liberal democracy. It will harmonise, he 
said, the work of Joseph de Maistre from the theological tradition, with that 
of Condorcet from the progressive tradition. It is at this point in the discus-
sion of the utopian method and the theory of this specific utopia that Comte 
introduces the concept of sociocracy. His exposition of the series is profoundly 
marred, as many have pointed out, by his omission of the key linking work of 
Saint-Simon. Strangely, socialism itself is now firmly planted in the decomposing 










arrives from the industrial base, but the positive movement includes Maistre, 
phrenology and Comte’s own contribution, and that is all (2001 [1851-1854], 
vol. 3, p. 526-531). There is certainly no possibility of deducing the positive 
polity by extrapolation from this material, a sleight of hand has occurred. 
The major “negative” sequence includes the Declaration of the rights of man, 
Napoleon  I, the Catholic revival, militarism in decline, restored monarchy, 
parliamentarism, socialism, anarchical communism, autocratic repression of 
workers, the eventual abolition of monarchy in 1848, and the coup d’État which 
cleared the way for positivism (ibid, p. 510-526). 
What is interesting is that Comte finds it very hard to imagine the emer-
gence of a stable metaphysical polity; these are all variants on a theme of 
instability and confusion, not eu-phrenia but schizo-phrenia, the phrenolo-
gical balance of society itself is disturbed16. Thus the metaphysical polity 
is conceived as one that has no stable unique form, there is only one basic 
systematic and irresolvable antagonism. It is in continual movement. Yet, 
suddenly, in 1851 the new dictatorship of Napoleon III has at last been esta-
blished as a stable dictatorship. This is a possible mode of transition to the 
positive polity—all that is needed is to start the process of transition and 
for Napoleon III to legitimise Positivism at the head of a League of Religions 
(combining Jesuits and other willing partners). Comte has figured his trai-
ning of the positivist priesthood will take too long, and he now radically 
changed tack. The religion of Humanity will institute the formation of a new 
church by aligning itself with the believers of certain other religions that have 
opposed the disorganisation created by the Reformation. The new enemies 
are the unreformed Protestants, the Deists, the Sceptics and the imperfect 
scientists (even the positivists attached to the first Comtean doctrine).
The key underlying idea behind Comte’s method is to be able to show 
that the new God will not be a theological or metaphysical one: it is the 
rising progressive movement itself which is responsible for its creation and 
appearance. This is why it must have been so unexpected to Comte’s readers, 
16  On Comte’s phrenology as a political metaphor, see Richard Vernon, 1986.
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suddenly to find that de Maistre’s conservative defence of Catholicism is to 
be found in the positive series followed only by the works of Comte himself. 
In effect the argument for the creation of the new God independently of any 
modification of a theological entity (Christian Deity to Deism for example) is 
highly artificial and centred strictly on Comte himself—he will not allow that 
there is a social movement involved at all, where one might expect a reference 
to the new Christianity of the Saint-Simonians.
Comte has carefully denied any influence from the Saint-Simonians in the 
Preface to the third volume of the System. But if there is no social movement for 
the new religion where are the believers to be found? Comte provides an answer: 
the believers already exist. They are the members of the existing proto-socio-
cratic religions, especially Catholics. All that is necessary is “to represent the 
pretended Creator as really a creation, not of man, but of Humanity”. Catholics 
should worship and “glorify the Virgin as the mystic precursor of Humanity; 
her adoration will be easily replaced so as to lead Catholic souls, especially those 
of women, to the Positivist worship.” (Comte, 1901, p.175).
5. THE SUBJECTIVE SYNTHESIS IN THE OBJECTIVE WORLD
Comte’s utopian hopes for an immediate mass conversion to the new 
religion of Humanity were however dashed. He began to sketch out ideas 
of a new League against “science” on the model of the League against 
Protestantism, or the League against Napoleon I. It will be an alignment of 
Positivism with Catholicism, Eastern Orthodoxy, elements of Protestanism, 
Islam, against “science”. He re-read, after fifteen years, his earlier work, The 
Positive Philosophy, and was so shocked he had to recharge his emotional balance 
by reading poetry. Gradually he began to argue that the new Religion would 
be purely poetic and that science itself along with metaphysics and theology 
would be gradually extinguished. What was valuable in science and the work 
of scientists would be transformed into poetry. 
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An immense cycle of cultural history was thus emerging of human culture 
from fetishism and back to fetishism. But the immediate threat to his new 
Religion now appeared to come not from competing religions but from the 
scientists who believed in possible revolutions in knowledge to come. The great 
centre of the religion of Humanity would not be Paris after all but the holy 
city of Constantinople. The new League against “science” which has “become 
detrimental” to progress (Comte, 1901, p.120), would involve Islam directly: he 
imagined believers would be quickly won over to his new Religion. His ideas 
became utopian in the most naive sense. Yet there was a certain realism, indeed 
even a Comtean dry wit, in thinking that the world revolution to the completed 
universal polity would take at least 700 years to accomplish (ibid., p.111).
6. FORWARDS, SIDEWAYS OR BACKWARDS?
Today it is not possible to accede to Comte’s claim that the religion of 
Humanity is scientifically valid, demonstrably so. The scientists in Comte’s 
own time refused to accept the synthesis and its new God as such, and Comte 
was forced to disassociate himself from them and defined them as a threat to 
the new Religion. The value of Comte’s last writings and his utopian sociology 
does not lie in its scientificity as such, but in the fiction-theory of its ideal type 
Isidore. and the new account of the three organic transitions in European history. 
But what, exactly, is the new spiritual power organised along the lines of the 
Catholic Church? It could be viewed as the idea of intellectual culture (including 
science and medicine, etc.) as a version of a new clerisy (Knights, 1978), or 
more radically as the prototype of a new kind of political organisation, a kind of 
ideological state formation (Wernick, 2001, p.235). The route to Isidore however 
for Comte was expected to be long and the separation of the two spiritual and 
temporal powers could only be achieved by careful preparation and realised by 
guarantees to the independence of the Church in the final phase of the transi-
tion. There is therefore liberalism within the polity, just as there was for Hobbes. 
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After the division of powers takes place, unlike the “Party” in Orwell, 
the new Church as spiritual authority does not itself govern, it is the highest 
counsel: it advises power, provides its programme of action, its mottos, and 
watches over it by enshrining the highest conscience and concern for the 
welfare of humanity and the cult of “Humanity”. Its structure and culture is 
profoundly different from that founded on political power or material wealth, 
devoted to service in practical sense, education and to prayer, rightly termed 
a kind of psychotechnics by John Tresch (2012, p.276). In the final stage, 
temporal power is much reduced physically in territorial dimension, politi-
cally concentrated into fewer functions and functionaries, and the remaining 
ministers appointed, not elected (though residual elected elements are envi-
saged, 2001 [1851-1854] vol.4, p.395), by the existing power holders (on the 
advice of the Pontiff). Thus there are two powers confronting each other, 
with the sovereign power residing in the Church as in the final third phase 
the government is completely won over to the new Religion and its legitimate 
authority. All this is, as Comte insists, achieved without force or violence, 
within complete liberty of action: a demonstration of the new status of scien-
tific knowledge suitably transformed. Transformed and, it has to be empha-
sised, controlled and regulated; a position which H. G. Wells ridiculed, “the 
intimate texture of his mind was dull and hard, the conception slipped from 
him […] his imposition of a rule of life upon the poietic types, who are least 
able to sustain it, mark how deeply he went under.” (2005 [1905], p.184). 
All this is, clearly, utopian even down to the specification of the content and 
bodily gestures of prayer (all modelled on, or parodies of, Catholicism). Comte 
justifies this prophecy as science, since the utopia is a genre of hypothesis, fiction 
necessary to science, a thought experiment. But this particular experiment, given 
its subjective nature, falls outside of science as it is conventionally understood, 
and this is why the term Positivism was invented, or at least redefined in the last 
writings. It includes science on condition it is fused with fetishism, transformed 
into an organised religion with an affective element, in effect a “religious” secu-
larisation that can in the end be “consecrated” into faith. It opens up the concept 
of civic duty as a universal prosaic “religion of Humanity” and human rights. 
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For Comte, the religion of Humanity is not only “universal” in honour of its 
derivation from Catholicism, but because it celebrates universal human culture, 
but selectively. The Church remains an “objective” social corporation with entry 
and exit rituals: individuals are not born into it, but become members and go 
through a life cycle of ritual stages; yet it is a place of subjective belonging, even 
perhaps after death when individual souls can literally be incorporated into God. 
Above all such a religion is a long training in moral education; the individual 
is in infinite debt to human culture, and must know that this debt exists17. The 
dead increasingly govern the living through the accumulation of the total cultu-
ral capital of humanity. Fear and rejection of death and the dead are one of the 
diseases of the metaphysical state. For positivism an individual exists objectively 
and subjectively, and after death subjectively in the memory of others; it theo-
rises a history “without names”, as well as a “cult of great human beings”, and so 
the Supreme Being is constituted by all the anonymous contributions to human 
culture and by those which are linked to names and peoples18. “Humanity”, in 
this conception, is thus transcendent of any one individual or even humanity 
itself in its objective life at any moment. “To live only, or even chiefly in the 
present, he says, would be as irrational in philosophy as it is depraved in mora-
lity, and it must issue in interminable scepticism” (2001 [1851-1854], vol.2, p.296). 
Comte’s priesthood, he thinks for humanity’s sake, defines and will control 
access to Humanity, the classic mode of acquisition of spiritual power by priests 
(Baudrillard, 1993 [1976], p.125-195). Positivism in this sense appropriates to 
itself, by attempting to control “Humanity”, the basic spontaneous privilege of 
humanity itself. But the feature which is typically Comtean in its extremism is 
that the Highest Priest will have absolute ascendancy in the spiritual organisa-
tion: “He is the priesthood, and, at need, could change all its members, leaving 
the spiritual organism intact. The Papacy, at all times hampered by the college 
17  Giorgio Agamben (2013 [2012]) traces the shift in Catholic tradition from prayer as worship 
to duty as repayment of debt.
18  The project of a history “sans noms”  is mentioned  in Comte’s Cours  (1975  [1830-1842] 
vol.2, p.239); and in a  letter of 1856 he wrote: “I alone have instituted the cult of great 
men”  (cited  in  Pickering,  1993-2009,  vol.3,  p.413).  The material  fetishes  of  this  cult  are 
discussed by Wolf Lepenies, 2012 (2010). 
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of cardinals, and often liable to Councils, was never able to attain the ascen-
dancy which will be allowed the Pontificate of Humanity.” (2001 [1851-1854], 
vol.4,  p.226)19. Comte does not seem to be able to imagine the scenario in 
which the priesthood itself disposes the High Priest.
CONCLUSION
To sum up, it is possible to make a number of observations on the utopian 
experiment. First of all two crucial concepts were needed to work out the 
full logic of the argument for Isidore: altruism and sociocracy. It also requi-
red a redefinition of religion for the scheme to function, and indeed also a 
reconsideration of science, positivism and of theory. Secondly, Comte had 
great difficulty in working through his historical method both in the objective 
and subjective modes. In The Positive Philosophy he left the third state in rather 
vague outline, although he claimed his “twofold” positive and negative series 
were constructed in relation to it. In System he claims to have shown that the 
construction of his utopia was based on the logic of historical progression 
and a deduction as to the normal state of human existence. In fact he faced 
a real problem. In constructing his utopia he simply fabricated a new histori-
cal sequence as a retro-genealogy to 1789 in which he placed his own work 
as the key to universal history. Thirdly, the method of construction of the 
utopia was therefore certainly based on a theory of cultural accumulation, but 
it is clear that certain deeply held “subjective” cultural values played a crucial 
role in his identification of this accumulation. Fourthly, Comte also claims his 
19  This passage is strikingly similar to Saint-Simon’s Political Parable of 1819 (Saint-Simon, 1975, 
p.194-197).  Comte  here,  in  a  kind  of  Religious  Parable,  only  briefly  indicated,  suggests 










utopia is a prophecy: something like this utopia will eventually be realised. It 
is thus instructive to note that the scenario of a large number of small states 
overseen by a spiritual power has not appeared, yet. But if we concede that a 
combination of spiritual and temporal powers was anticipated as the first step 
on the route to Isidore then the question is: have there, or are there states which 
exhibit the following characteristics: a free market economy dominated by 
banking, extreme concentration of wealth that escapes legal control, a socio-
cratic formation of its elites, and submissive proletariat20 ?
Looking at fiction-theory, and ideal types, it is interesting to note that 
the invention of sociocracy (Comte locates a “monocratic” form on route 
to the positive polity) and Weber’s ideal type of “monocratic” bureaucracy 
(1978 [1922], vol.1, p.223-226; vol.2, p.956-1005) share many features. Yet the 
important term sociocratic does not exist in modern sociology after the Lester 
Ward generation. In Nineteen Eighty-four George Orwell identifies the Party 
machine as in some way modelled on such an idea: the ruling organisation 
is simply a “ruling group as long as it can nominate its successors”. So “the 
Party is not concerned with perpetuating its blood but with perpetuating 
itself, who wields power is not important provided that the hierarchical struc-
ture remains the same” (Orwell, 1989 [1949], p.218). 
Comte saw the problems here. He saw that the allocation of agents to 
functions would be imperfect and cause justifiable resentment. His solution 
was to insist that the spiritual authority would, through lengthy education, 
instil resignation. The transition period of proletarian dictatorship, “with 
the aim of eliminating the bourgeoisie as the main seat of Western anar-
chism” in the Comtean prophecy only more firmly entrenched this proleta-
riat as a fixed stratum at the bottom of the status hierarchy (2001 [1851-1854], 
vol.4, p.393-394). There is great inequality and a significantly greater concen-
tration of capital—hostility to which is overcome through religious trai-





education, astronomy and philosophy (ibid., vol.3, p.171-175). Indeed capital 
is no longer primarily subject to law, but principally to moral constraint. 
And looked at precisely from this point of view, the indication that the first 
step in the route would be an articulation of the new spiritual power with a 
dictatorship (secular or not) opened the possibility of a new kind of tyranny 
(Saint-Simon, 1975, p.198) warned repeatedly of the dangers of allowing the 
spiritual corporation access to power). Weber (1978 [1922], vol.2, p.1159-1163) 
called this formation “caesaropapism”, that is the control and direction of 
the spiritual by the temporal power; and the combination or fusion in the 
theory of the modern party-state (the ideological and repressive state appara-
tuses) is such a formation (Wernick, 2001, p. 228-239). 
This danger is signalled by Comte. The route is open also to the totali-
tarian regulation of life of humanity by the believers in “Humanity”. Comte 
even anticipates calling on “true believers to feel themselves bound to furnish 
to the priesthood the information as to persons without which its influence 
would be too uncertain”—and he notes “never was a system of political police 
so effectively carried out, at scarcely any cost, as in 1793, when under the irre-
sistible impulse of public necessities, all true patriots considered it their duty 
to make known to the chiefs of the state such facts as could usefully enligh-
ten their conduct”, just as “the Catholic regime […] was once seconded by 
the communications rightly made by domestics with respect to their masters” 
(Comte, 1901, p.116). This utopia was, it seems, always insecure (Vernon, 2005). 
It is clear that the immediate effect of the utopia of the religion of 
Humanity on its adherents was disastrous. Fictions were devised to be aids 
to analysis (2001 [1851-1854], vol.1, p.530). Instead of using it as a basis 
for the analysis of the metaphysical state and its developments, adherents 
were drawn into endless attempts to realise it or to justify it as the solu-
tion to all problems, even after the social structures of Western Europe had 
changed in the last quarter of the xixth century leaving Comteans stranded. 
John Bridges (1915), among others, is witness to the resignation of positivists 
to the new systems of state welfare and education. They stubbornly conti-
nued and sustained a number of campaigns for example against imperia-
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lism21. Perhaps John Gray’s judgement (2007) should be heeded: it is always 
in the attempt to realise utopias that the essential and irresolvable problems 
begin. Or at the limit Eric  Wright  (2010) presents the oxymoron of “real 
utopias” that is “realisable” with the means available at any given time; it is 
interesting to note that Comte’s own very detailed and excessively precise 
planning and timing of Isidore only further underlined its utopian character22. 
Indeed Comte relegates absolute reality to metaphysics and perverse science.
Finally, giving Comte’s utopia the name Isidore makes its unique contours 
easier to identify. With its hierarchies, great inequalities, its sociocratic caste-
like strata and submissive but watchful and knowing proletariat, its holy 
virginal and loving matriarchy, its sacerdotalised astronomical wisdom with, 
at its apex, the High Priest of “Theory”, it is a utopia devoted to “continuity”. 
Its subjective “imaginative reconstruction of society” provokes a certain kind 
of theoretical invention. It was from this utopian matrix that modern culture 
received from Comte the hardly negligible conception of positive religion 
devoted to altruism, and organised as a sociocracy. Such a utopia, of such 
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